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CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE
PROCEEDINGS.
RULES prescribing forms for the guidance of legislatures are
incorporated in many of the state constitutions now in force. These
vary in their scope, in some cases extending to a considerable
number of requirements, and in others being few in number. They
are also expressed in varying terms. Their purpose is the prevention of some of the evils which grew out of legislation when little
or no restriction was placed upon the mode of procedure, "as if
with the advance toward ' a higher civilization' greater precautions
were requisite in legislative matters than in the early days of our
state's history."
The -English-Doctrine.-There are no restrictions upon the Parliament of Great Britain as to the mode of its procedure, and there
is no such thing known to English law as the unconstitutional
enactment of a statute. There can be no inquiry as to the regularity of an enactment; the enrolled act is a verity: Rex v. Arundel,
Hob. 110; Prince's Case, 8 Coke 145. There is no common law
in this country in conflict with this: People v. -Devlin, 33 N. Y.
281; State v. Swift, 10 -Nev. 176; Pangborn v. Young, 32
N. J. L. 29; Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253; Falconerv. Higgins, 2 McLean 195; Pacific Railroad Co. v. Governor, 23 Mo.
362; _ouke v. .Fleming, 13 Md. 412; Brodnax v. Groom, 64
N. C. 244; People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121.
In many cases constitutional regulations of the forms of procedure
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are said to be mandatory on legislative bodies; but after action the
presumption is that they have been observed, and the courts will
not go back of the enrolled act to impeach it. See Usener v.
State, 8 Tex. App. 177; Central Railway Co. v. iearne, 32 Tex.
546; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Id. 641; Kilgore v. .Afagee, 85
Penn. St. 401; People v. Burke, 34 Cal. 661; -Eld v. Gorham,
20 Conn. 8 ; People v. Commissioners, 54 N. Y. 276 ; Evans v.
Browne, 30 Ind. 514; Bender v. State, 53 Id. 254; Commissioners
v. Burford, 93 Id. 383; -dger v. Board, 70 Id. 831; Lottery
Co. v. Richoux, 23 La. Ann. 743; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss.
650; Swann v. Buck, 40 Id. 268; Mayor v. Harwood, 32 Md.
471; Thompson's Case, 9 Op. Attys.-Gen. 1; Miller v. State, 5
Ohio St. 275; Purdy v. People, 4 Hill 390; -DeBow v. People,
I Den. 14; State v. Glenn, 1 West Coast Rep. 50, and cases
cited ante.
Conflict of Authority.-The rule which seems to be established
by these cases has not been uniformly held by several of the courts
which decided them. In some states, especially California and
Missouri, changes in the fundamental law have necessitated the
establishment of a rule different from that announced in the cases
cited. But before the constitutions now in force in these states
were adopted there was a conflict of authority. In Yowler v.
Peirce, 2 Cal. 165, the court say, by MURRAY, C. J.: "I am of
opinion that there is no difference between declaring a law uncbnstitutional for matters patent upon its face, though passed regularly,
and a law apparently good, yet passed in violation of those rules
which the constitution has imposed for the protection of the rights
and liberties of the citizen." The court held an act which purported to have been approved on a day on which it might legally
have been done, void, because as a matter of fact it was approved
when the power to do the act did not exist. In State v. McBride,
4 Mo. 303, the question was whether an amendment to the constitution had been voted for by the required number of members of
the legislature, and it appears to have been determined by the
record contained in the legislative journals. This case was doubtless overruled by Pacific Railroad Co. v. Governor, ante, which
has been overruled by Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 33,. and State v.
.Mead, 71 Id. 266. Both these last cases were decided under the
present constitution, which differs materially from that in force
when the earlier cases were ruled. Sherman v. Story has also
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been overruled by Weill v. Ifenfield, 54 Cal. 111, under a like
change in the fundamental law. The earlier cases in Indiana held
to the American doctrine. See Skinner v. Deming, 2 Ind. 558 ;
Coleman v. Dobbins, 8 Id. 156. And intimations and dicta in its
favor are to be found in some of the New York cases, which have
been frequently cited in its support. See People,v. Purdy, 2 Hill
31; s. c. in error, 4 Id. 384; De Bow v. People, 1 Den. 9;
Com. Bank v. Sparrow, 2 Id. 97. The rule in Maryland has
been changed by Berry v. Baltimore, etc., Railroad Co., 41 Md.
446, and Legg v. Mayor, etc., 42 Id. 203. The cases cited from
Mississippi must be considered overruled by Brady v. West, 50
Miss. 68, where the court say: "It is clearly competent to show
from the journals of either branch of the legislature that a particular
act was not passed in the mode prescribed by the constitution, and
thus defeat its operation altogether." Two Iowa cases (Clare v.
State, 5 Iowa 509; Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Id. 1) are often cited
in support of the doctrine that the enrolled act is conclusive; but they
only determine that where there is a conflict between the printed
and the enrolled act, the latter is the ultimate proof of the expression of the legislative will. Whether the journals were competent,
evidence, or their effect, was not considered in either case: Zoeher
v. Bill, 60 Iowa 543.
The American Dotrine.-The power and duty of courts to look
behind the enrolled act and determine that it has received the
required number of votes, or that in its enactment there has been a
substantial compliance with the forms prescribed by the constitution
is upheld by a large number of cases: Skinner v. Denning, 2 Ind.
528; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667; Smithee v. Garth, 33
Ark. 17 ; Hull v. Miller,4 Neb. 503 ; Walker v. Griffith, 60 Ala.
361; Williams v. State, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 549; Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330; Coleman v. Dobbins, 8 Ind. 156; In re
Roberts, 5 Colo. 525; In re Welman, 20 Vt. 656; 12egg v.
Mayor, &c.,42 Md. 203; Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85; State
v. Platt, 2 S.C. 150; Walker v. State, 12 Ind. 200; State v.
iagood,13 Id. 46; Worthen v. Badgett, 32 Ark. 496; State v.
3Mead, 71 Mo. 266; Smithee v. Campbell, 41 Ark. 471; South
Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill.
297; Prescott v. Trustees, 19 Id. 324 ; People v. Starne, 35 Id.
121; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Id. 160: Turley v. County of Logan,
17 Id. 151; Burr v. Bos8, 19 Ark. 250; Weill v. .Kenfield, 54
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Cal. 111; Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St. 1; Berry v. Baltimore,
stc., Railroad Co., 41 Md. 446; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 33;
Green v. Graves, I Doug. (Mich.) 351; People v. Mahaney, 13
Mich. 481 ; State v. Francis,26 Kans. 724; State ex rel. v. Hastings, 24 Minn. 78; Brown v. Nash, 1 Wyoming 85; State v.
Little Bock, .c., Railway Co., 31 Ark. 701; Vinsant v. Jnox,
27 Id. 266 ; lroody v. State, 48 Ala. 115 : Gaines v. Ilorrigan,
4 Lea (Tenn.) 608; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 722;
Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721 ; Southwark Banc v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446; Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wall. 489; State
v. Gould, 31 Minn. 189. See Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 548;
Bound v. Railroad Co., 45 Wis. 543.
To hold that the legislative journals are not appropriate evidence
on the question whether a bill had been passed by the constitutional
number of votes would in effect be to hold that a bill may become
a law without receiving the number of votes required by the constitution ; that a single presiding officer may, by his signature, give
the force of law to a bill which the journal of the body over which
he presides, and which is kept, under the supervision of the whole
body, shows not to have been voted for by the" constitutional number of members: Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St. 1. The Supreme Court of the United States say : " We are of opinion, therefore, on principle as well as authority, that whenever a question
*arises in a court of law of the existence of a statute, or of the time
when a statute took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the
judges who are called upon to decide it, have a right to resort to
any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such
question; always seeking first for that which in its nature is most
appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule :"
Gardnerv. Collector, 6 Wall. 499. The validity of .a statute is
a question of law, and the court will not act upon the admission of
parties that it has not been passed in a constitutional manner:
Happel v. Brethauer, 70 Ill. 166. See Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.
S.268; Pdst v. Supervisors, 105 Id. 667; Railroad Tax Cases,
13 Fed. Rep. 767.
Notice of Applicationfor Enactment of Law.-The constitution
of Alabama provides that " no,local or special law shall be passed
on any subject which cannot be provided for by a general law, unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been pub-
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lished," &c. In Barrson v. Gordy, 57 Ala. 49, the legislative
journal showed that the notice given was of intention to apply for
an act prohibiting the sale of liquors within four miles of the courthouse at St. Stephens. The bill corresponded with the notice, but
was amended to embrace an area of eight miles. In reply to the
contention that the notice did not warrant the act, the court said
that it was perfectly consistent with all that appeared in the journals
that the notice embraced the larger area. It will not be presumed
from the silence of the journals that the prescribed notice was not
given, and that the required proof of it was not made: Walker v.
Griffith, 60 Ala. 361. In North Carolina, under a similar provision, the signatures of the presiding officers make the law a matter
of record, and it cannot be impeached collaterally. In Arkansas
a law having for its object the settlement of a debt due from the
citizens of the state to it, and its debt due to them, is not within
the scope of the constitutional requirement, not being, it seems,
local or special: State v. Crawford, 35 Ark. 237. In Florida the
prohibition of the constitution concerning the amendment of acts of
incorporation, unless notice had been given, could not control the
legislature in the matter of legislation concerning roads belonging to
the system of internal improvements which the constitution made it
the duty of the legislature to create and encourage: -Palmerv.
Louisville, c., Railroad Co., 19 Fla. 231.
The constitution of Rhode Island requires tbat when a bill shall
be presented for the creation of certain corporations it shall be
continued until another election of members of the general assembly
shall have taken place, and that such public notice of the pendency
thereof shall be given as may be required by law. The Supreme
Court of Maine has held these provisions to be directory merely,
and not to affect corporations unless in case of intervention by the
state. After charter is granted, the presumption is that all preliminary requirements have been complied with: McClinh v.
Sturgis, 72 Me. 288. A statute requiring that notice of private
petitions pending before the legislature should be given in a prescribed manner, held to be merely directory. The legislature might
act upon a notice which did not comply with the statute, or without notice: D~ay v. Stetson, 8 Me. 365.
The _nacting Style.-An enacting style is prescribed by nearly
all the State constitutions. In his work on the Law and Practice
of Legislative Assemblies, p. 820, Cushing says; "Where enacting
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words are prescribed, nothing can be a law which is not introduced
by these very words, even though others which are equivalent, are
at the sam6 time used." The authorities do not sustain this statement, and are not harmonious. The direction is not mandatory,
and the omission of the words "by the general assembly of Maryland" from the enacting clause, does not render the act void :
toPlherson v Leonard, 25 Md. 877. An act without an enacting
clause is void: Seat of Government Cases, 1 Wash. Ter. 135.
When a bill adopting a body of laws, divided into separate chapters,
is preceded by the required words, it is sufficient: Dew v.
Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466. But when sections and chapters of a
code or revision are passed at different times, such of them as do
not contain an enacting clause are void: Vinsant v. knox, 27
Ark. 266. Literal compliance with the words used in the constitution is not essential. "Resolved," held equivalent to "be it enacted," in a joint resolution which had the force of law: Swann v.
Buck, 40 Miss. 268. The style prescribed for laws is inapplicable
to a "resolution, order or vote," as contradistinguished from a
"bill," by the constitution: State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76.
Whether it is mandatory or directory only as to laws is discussed
but not decided in Navigation Co. v. Galveston, 45 Tex. 287.
A statute is not void because when introduced the bill had no enacting clause: -Powell v. Jackson Com. Council, 51 Mich. 129.
Where the enacting clause is stricken out of a bill, and the house
which struck it out subsequently passed the bill, the journal not
showing a reconsideration of the first vote, the passage of the bill
held to be tantamount to a rescission thereof: Wenner v. Thornton,
98 I1. 156.
In West Virginia the force and effect of law cannot be given to a
joint resolution : Boyers v. (,rane, 1 West Va. 176.
A statute providing that the form of an ordinance by the county
board of supervisors should be : "The county board of supervisors
of the county ofdo order and determine as follows," is mandatory, and was not complied with by proceedings disclosed by the rethe board of supervisors
cord to be a follows : "On motion of do order and determine :" Smith v. Sherry, 54 Wis. 114. In
Austrian v. Guy, 21 Fed. Rep. 500, the same statute was considered, and was held to be complied with by an order as follows: "It
is understood, ordered and determined."
Several readings.-Provisions requiring that all bills of a gen-
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eral character, or all bills appropriating money, or certain other
classes of bills shall be read at length one or more times on one or
more days, are embodied in a number of constitutions. In some
states th6 requirement is held to be mandatory, and that failure to
comply will invalidate the law: People v,(lampbell, 8 Ill. 466,
limited by Sapervisors v. People, 25 Id. 181 ; People v. Starne,
35 Id. 121; Supervisors v. ffeenan, .2 Minn. 330; State v.
Hagood, 13 S. 0. 46. In others it is merely directory: Usener
v, State, 8 Tex. App, 177; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641.
Its observance is secured by the sense of duty and the official oaths
of members of the legislature, and not by any supervisory power
of the courts: JHilgore v. Aagee, 85 Penn, St. 401; Miller v.
State, 5 Ohio St. 275,
Where the journals show that a bill was passed, and contain
nothing to show that it was not read as the constitution requires,
the presumption is that it was so read, and this presumption is not
liable to he rebutted: Miller v. State, ante; Supervisors v. People,
25 Ill. 181; qualifying Campbell v. People, 8 Id. 466.; Walker
v. Griffith, 60 Ala. 361; State ex rel. v. Hastings, 24 Minn. 43;
Vinsant v. fKnox, 27 Ark. 279; .English v. Oliver, 28 Id. 317;
Worthen v. Badgett, 32 Id. 516; Usenerv,State, 8 Tex. App. 177;
Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. If the journals are kept
loosely the law will be sustained if compliance with the constitution can be spelled out: Szpervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330. If
a third reading is shown two previous readings will be implied and
the act upheld .English v. Oliver, ante.
The constitution now in force in California provides: "Nor
shall any bill become a law unless the same shall be read on three
* And on the final passage of all
several days in each house, *
Zenfleld, 54 Cal.
bills they shell be read at length." In Weill -v.
111, this is copstrued as requiring every bill to be read at length
on three separate days in each house, and that the silence of the
journals as to the suspension of the rule does not support the presumption that the bill was read, See Railroad Tax Cases, 13
Fed. Rep. 722, 76Q. The first clause quoted aboxe is in the
constitution of South Carolina, and the doctrioe of State v. Hagood,
ante, is to the effect that the readings must be shown from the journals, or the original bill, or both. Under a similar provision in
the constitution of Texas, the contrary rule is established: Usener
v. State,, 8 Tex. App. 177; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641.
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If a bill, after being twice read in the house to which it is sent
for concurrence, is recalled by the house in which it originated, one
additional reading after its return to the house from which it was
recalled, is a substantial compliance: State v. Crawford, 85 Ark.
237. A bill may be read the first time in the house to which it is sent
for concurrence on the same day of its passage by the other house:
(hicot Co. v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200; State v. Crawford, ante.
A slight change in the title of a bill will not invalidate the readings it had before the change was made: Larrison v. Peoria, etc.,
Railroad Co., 77 Ill. 11; Walnut v. Wade, 108 U. S. 683;
Plummer v. People, 74 Ill. 361. If the identity of the bill can
be ascertained from the journals, and the change is not one of
substance and apt or calculated to mislead, the validity of the act
will not be affected: Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330.
Where it is required that the bill shall be read at length it is not
necessary that everything which is to become law by its enactment
should be read. In Bibb County Loan Association v. Richards,
21 Ga. 592, it is ruled that a statute incorporating a loan association and making all its transactions by and with its members, whilst
acting under and by virtue of certain authority, valid and binding
in law, was valid, notwithstanding the transactions to which reference was made were not incorporated in the statute and were not
read. In Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466, it is remarked that
to construe this provision to include everything which is to become
law by the enactment of a bill, would exclude the power to make
comprehensive enactments.
Are amendments required to be read?-In Miller v. State, 5
Ohio St. 275, the bill originally introduced, after being read twice,
and on different days, was referred to a select committee, who
reported it back with one amendment, to wit, "strike out all after
the enacting clause and insert a new bill ;" this bill was subsequently amended and then agreed to, read the third time and
passed. It was argued that this "new bill" should have been read
three times. In reply, the court say: "But, for argument's sake,
let it be adniitted that the bill as amended was read but once in the
senate; is the act, for that reason, void? That, counting the two
readings before the amendment, and the final reading, the bill was
read three times, is conceded, for these readings are shown by
the journal, and it is also conceded that, in general, three readings
of an amendment are not necessary. But inasmuch as the amend-

OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS.

161

ment in this case is styled in the journal "a new bill" it is said
that three readings were necessary. Why necessary? The amendment was none the less an amendment because of the name given
it. * * * When the subject or proposition of the bill is thereby
wholly changed, it would seem to be proper to read the amended
bill three times, and on different days; but when there is no
such vital alteration, three readings of the amendment are not
required." In Fergusonv. Miners' Bank, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 609,
there is no direct adjudication, "but it is said that adopting amendments of a character entirely distinct from that of the bill, on its
third and last reading, has the appearance, at least of an evasion
of the constitution. If the new matter is not germane to that of
the original bill, it would seem to be a new bill, although it may
be called an amendment, and if so, should be read three times
instead of once in each house. In English v. Oliver, 28 Ark. 317,
the rule in Miller v. State, ante, was followed. The court say:
"The proceedings appear to have been irregular, or that a complete
journal was not made of all that was done. It is not affirmatively
shown how this substitute bill name before the house, nor is it
affirmatively shown that it was read a first and second time, but
the journal shows that it was read a third time. To have a third
reading would imply a first and second, and there is nothing before
us to show that such readings were not had." Amendments are
not embraced within the meaning of the constitution of Illinois:
People ex rel. v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680; nor in South Carolina, it
seems: State v. Platt, 2 S. C. 150, 156.
Suspension of Rule requiring Several Beadings.-In cases of
"urgency" or "emergency" the rule concerning readings may be
suspended by a majority or two-thirds vote. Whether any given
state of circumstances present a "case of urgency" authorizing a
suspension of this rule is solely for the legislature to determine;
and the reasons for its action need not be given in the journals :
.Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503. Where the journals recite that by a
yea and nay vote the readings were dispensed with, the presumption
is that the vote was a two-thirds vote, and that there was a case of
emergency: Afc ulloeh v. State, 11 Ind. 424. When the required
number of readings are shown on the same day a strong and prima
facie implication arises that the suspension of the rule was deemed
expedient: Turley v. County of Logan, 17 Ill. 151. Where it is
VOL. XXXII.-21
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not required that the journals affirmatively show that the rules were
suspended, and the bill was read by title, the presumption is that
they were suspended: Chicot County v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200;
Vinsant v. Knox, 27 Id. 278; -Englishv. Oliver, 28 Id. 320.
Setting out Revised, Altered or Amended Acts at Lenqth.-In
some constitutions provisions are to be found of the same import as
the following from the constitution of Michigan: "No law shall be
revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only, but the
act revised or section or sections of the act altered or amended shall
be re-enacted, and published at length." In People v. Hahaney,
13 Mich. 481, it is said: "This constitutional provision must receive a reasonable construction, with a view to give it effect. The
mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory
statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the
difficulty of making the necessary examination and comparison,
failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An
amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to
substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was
only referred to but not re-published, was well calculated to mislead
the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that
form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such
legislation."
This provision is not merely a rule of procedure for the legislature, but renders null and void any law which does not conform to
it. It is binding upon all branches of the government. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9 ; Smails v. White, 4 Neb.
353 ; Sovereign v. State, 7 Id. 409 ; Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La.
Ann. 297 ; 1leGhee v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 622.
It makes no difference whether the intention to amend appears
from the title or body of the act ; if it has that effect it is within
this provision: Smailg v. White, ante. In Indiana an act is not
within the constitution unless it professes to amend some act or
section of an existing law: Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194.
This is the general rule. See People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481;
Lake v. Palmer, 18 Fla. 501; Cooley's Cons. Lim. *152, note 3.
Statutes which amend or repeal by implication are not embraced:
State v. Draper,47 Mo. 29; Geisen v. Heiderich, 104 Ill. 537;
Fleischner v. Chadwick, 5 Ore. 152; State v. Cain, 8 W. Va.
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720; State v. Geiger, 65 Mo. 306; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio
St. 573. In People v. Whipple, 47 Cal. 592, it is determined that
it is competent for the legislature, in creating an office, to define
the duties of the incumbent by making reference to another and
existing statute, and to provide that those duties shall be the same
as required by the act so referred to. In consequence, of the rule
that repeals by implication are not favored, the repugnance between
the earlier and former statutes must be irreconcilable, or this rule
will not be applied: State v. D)raper, ante.
A complete law which of itself covers the entire subject with which
it deals is not in this provision: Jones v. Davis, 6 Neb. 38; -People
v. Wright, 70 Ill. 888 ; Commonwealth v. Drewry, 15 Gratt. 1 ;
Ex parte Pollard,40 Ala. 77; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; Parkinson v. State, 14 Id. 184. An act is independent when it embraces
matter not previously legislated upon, or it may be independent
when there is a law upon the subject, and the act does not attempt
to amend such law, but makes a new enactment: Blakemore
v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194. A law is revised or amended when it is in
whole or part permitted to remain, and something is added to or
taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make
it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the
object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or
purpose: Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 840.
If a section or part of a law is obnoxious to this provision, the
validity of the other parts or sections is not thereby affected, if
capable of separation: .Bx parte Pollard,40 Ala. 77.
The later cases generally hold that the requirement of the constitution is complied with by setting out at length the act or section
revised or amended as it is with the amendment or revision embodied
.in it: People v. Pritchard,21 Mich. 286; Portland v. Stock, 2
Ore. 69; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573; Van Riper
v. -Parsons,40 N. J. L. 128; Colwell v. Chamberlain, 43 Id.
887; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182. In Louisiana and Indiana it was formerly held that it was necessary to set out the law in
full as it stood before amendment or revision : Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327 ; Wilkins v. Miller, 9 Id. 102 ; Rogers v. State,
6 Id. 31; Kennon v. Shull, 9 Id. 154; Armstrong v. Berreman,
18 Id. 422. These cases were overruled in Greencastle, etc., Co.
v. State, 28 Id. 382, which has been adhered to ever since. The
Louisiana cases (Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann. 297; Heirs of
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Duverge v. Salter, 5 Id. 94), which were the basis of the rule
originally established in Indiana, appear to be overruled in Arnoult
v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 54.
Under the peculiar phraseology of the constitution of Missouri,
where an entire act is revised or re-enacted, it must be set forth and
published in whole; where the whole act is amended the same
course must be pursued, but where only a part of an act is amended
the amendatory part only need be set out and published: Mayor
v Trigg, 46 Mo. 288.
The constitution of Tennessee requires that "All acts which
revive, repeal or amend former laws shall recite, in their caption
or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, revived or
amended." This applies to repeals by implication: McGhee v.
State, 2 Lea 622. It does not require a recital of the substance
of an act any further than it is amended or repealed. If the substance of that part of the act which is to be amended or repealed
is recited, it is sufficient: State v. Gaines, 1 Id. 734.
The constitution of New York provides that "no act shall be
passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact
that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be applicable, except by inserting it in such act." In People ex rel. v. Banks, 67
N. Y. 568, it is remarked that "It is not necessary, in order to
avoid a conflict with this article of the constitution, to re-enact general laws whenever it is necessary to resort to them to carry into
effect a special statute. Such cases are not within the letter or
spirit of the constitution, or the mischief intended to be remedied.
By such a reference the general statute is not incorporated into or
made a part of the special statute, but the enforcement of the right
or duty, and the final imposition of the burden are directed to be in
the form, and by the procedure given by the other and general laws
of the state." In Wells v. Buffalo, 14 Hun 438, it is decided that
this provision does not contemplate that in an act amending a prior
one, the whole of the latter should be copied into it. It "should
only be applied when in a subsequent statute another act is referred
to, not to amend it, but to give effect to the provisions of the new.
In other words, the new act must, by its express terms, provide that
an existing law shall be made or deemed a part of it. This is not
done when the new act merely amends the former."
Miscellaneous Provisions.-Theconstitution of Michigan provides
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that "no new bill shall be introduced into either house of the legislature after the first fifty days of a session shall have expired."
In-iPack v. Barton, 47 Mich. 520, within the prescribed time a bill
was offered for the organization of the township of Montmorency,
and after the expiration of that time it was so changed as to provide
for the organization of a county with that name. The purpose of
each proposition was practically the same-to give the inhabitants of
the territory a distinct municipal government. There was nothing
to give rise to any inference that in the change made there was a
purpose to evade the constitutional command. It was held that
the act was not invalid. To the same effect is -Powellv. Jackson
Common 0ouncil, 51 Mich. 129.
It is provided by the constitution of Arkansas that "no bill shall
be so altered or amended on its passage, through either house,
as to change its original purpose." An amendment which limits
or extends the scope of the bill, but embraces no new matter not
germane to its original purpose, is not within this provision: Loftin
v. Watson, 32 Ark. 414.
The Required Vote.-Some courts distinguish between the constitutional requirements concerning the mode of enacting laws and
the authority by which they are enacted, and will take notice of the
journals where the validity of the law is challenged on the ground
that it did not receive the assent of the legislature, but will not do so
where a disregard of the prescribed forms of legislation is relied
upon to overturn it: Miller v. State, 5 Ohio St. 275 ; .Fordycev.
aodman, 20 Id. 1; Kilgore v. Jafgee, 85 Penn. St. 401, are instanced. In the last case the court observe : " The evidence of a
law-its actual existence-we may inquire into; for before we are
bound by it we must be satisfied it is the act of the legislature, however informally they may have conducted the process by which
they have made it a law. See Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth,
26 Penn. St. 446.
Where the vote on the passage of bills is not required to be taken
by yeas and nays and entered on the journal, the presumption arising from the signatures of the presiding officers to the enrolled act
will overcome their silence: Williams v. State, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 549;
In re Roberts, 5 Colo. 525 ; State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266 ; Worthen
v. Badgett, 82 Ark. 496. But where, the aye and nay vote is required to be entered on the journal, it must affirmatively appear that
the bill received a constitutional majority: Post v. Supervisors,105
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U. S. 677; Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 305; Supervisors v. Heenan, 2
Minn. 330 ; Green v. Graves, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 351 ; Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 111. 297 ; People v. Starne, 35 Id. 121; Ryan v. Lynch, 68
Id. 160; Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St. 1 ; People v. De Woy,
62 Ill. 253; Opinion of Justices, 35 N.H. 579; Raib:oad Tax Cases,
13 Fed. Rep. 722 ; County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railway Co., 18 Id. 385 ; State v. Francis,26 Kans. 724 ; Bond Debt
Cases, 12 S. C. 200. Where the journal shows that a bill did not receive the required two-thirds vote on its third reading in the.house,
but that it did upon its final passage by that body after it was returned
from the other body with slight amendments, it shows a substantial
compliance: Bond Debt Cases, ante. Names of members who
vote in the negative must appear as well as of those who vote in the
affirmative: Smithee v. Garth, 33 Ark. 17. A bill which the
journal shows to have been indefinitely postponed, and which it
does not show was ever taken up again, is not a law: Burr Y.
rRoss,
19 Ark. 250.
In Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104, the charter required
that the vote of the city council in certain cases should be entered
on the minutes. It was held not to be complied with by a record
which showed that a vote was adopted unanimously on call, the
names not appearing.
The provision of the constitution of New York requiring the
question upon the final passage of a bill to be taken immediately
upon its last reading and the yeas and nays to be entered on the
journal, is only directory to the legislature. There is no clause
declaring the act to be void if this direction be not followed: People
v. Supervisors, 8 N. Y. 317.
Amendments may be concurred in without entry of yeas and
nays in journal: Com. v. .Higginbotham, 17 Kans. 62; Haynes v.
Heller, 12 Id. 383; Bull v. .liller, 4 Neb. 503.
The constitution of West Virginia provides that no bill shall be
passed by either branch without an affirmative vote of the majority
of the members elected thereto. The senate was comprised of
twenty-two members, one of whom had resigned his seat after its
organization. An act which received eleven votes after such resignation was held valid: Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85. " Twothirds of the members of each branch of the general assembly,"
means two-thirds of the members present, a quorum voting: Morton
v. Comptroller-Gen., 4 S. C. 430; BondDebt Cases, 12 Id. 200.
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" Two-thirds vote," as these words are used in the constitution of
Mjnnesota, means a vote in each house of two-thirds of all the
members thereof: State v. Gould, 81 Minn. 189.
In People v. Hahaney, 18 Mich. 481, the court was asked to
declare an act unconstitutional because a portion of those who voted
for it were not legally elected. It was held that this could not be
done ; that while the court was bound to take notice of legislative
action concerning the validity of statutes, it could not do so in
regard to the facts attending the election of members, even though
the facts are to be found in the journals; that an act cannot be
declared void because a portion of those who voted for it, and whose
votes were essential to its passage, were not legally elected and
were retained in their seats by a decision opposed to the constitution.
The house of representatives of Kansas consisted of four more
persons than the maximum number provided for by the constitution. An act was passed by the aid of the votes of three of
the four persons who were not entitled to seats, but who were
admitted by the action of the house. It was held void: State v.
Francis,26 Kans. 724.
Signatures of PresidingOffiers.-In states where the enrolled
bill is conclusive as to the regularity of the proceedings, and the
signatures of the presiding officers thereto are required by the constitution, the only evidence that the bill has passed is furnished
thereby. Their signatures are absolutely essential to the existence
of the law: State v. Glenn, 1 West Coast Rep. 50; Pacific Bailroad Co. v. Governor, 23 Mo. 353; -Evans v. Browne, 80 Ind.
523; Broadnax v. Groom, 64 N. 0. 244; and are evidence of
its passage over the executive veto : Pacific Railroad Co. v. Governor, ante. It is intimated in Gaines v. Horrigan,4 Lea (Tenn.)
608, that the requirements of the new constitution that all bills
shall be signed in open session and that the fact of signing shall be
entered on the journal, is intended to furnish conclusive evidence
that they were passed.
The constitution of Missouri provides that "no bill shall become
a law until the same shall have been signed. by the presiding officer
of each house in open session." This requirement is mandatory:
State v. Head, 71 Mo. 266. Other provisions, such as requiring
him, before affixing his signature, to suspend all other business,
declare that such bill will now be read, and that the fact of signing
I
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shall be noted on the journal, are merely directory: Ibid. The
same rule, as to the fact of signing being noted on the journals,
is held in Colorado: In re 1oberts, 5 Colo. 525. In Nebraska
it is provided that :'the presiding officer of each house shall sign
publicly, in the presence of the house over which he presides, while
the same is in session and capable of transacting business, all bills
and joint resolutions." In Cottrell v. State, 9 Neb. '125, it is said
that the signatures are merely a certificate to the governor that tle
bill has passed the requisite number of readings and been adopted
by the constitutional majority. Where the journals show that the
bill has received the required vote, and it has been approved, failure of the presiding officer of either house to attach his signature
will not invalidate it. This is the rule in Kansas: Commissioners
v. Higginbotham,17 Kans. 62. At common law signatures are not
necessary: Speer v. Plank-Road Co., 22 Penn. St. 876.
The constitution of Nevada requires the signatures of the presiding officers, and also of the secretary of the senate and clerk of the
assembly. The signature of the assistant secretary of the senate is
held to satisfy the requirements of the secretary's signature. State
v. Glenn, 1 West Coast Rep. 50. No little stress is laid on the
established legislative custom and the dire consequences which
would result from establishing the contrary doctrine.
Under a statute directing the presiding officers, when a bill
requires three-fifths of all the members elected to be present at its
final passage, to certify such fact, and making the certificate presumptive evidence of the fact, it was ruled that it was not competent
for the legislature to make the failure of its officers to append the
proper certificate, defeat the provisions of the constitution. People
v. Supervisors, 8 N. Y. 317. The certificate might be impeached
if it certified that the requisite number was present when the fact
was otherwise ; and if the certificate was not given, the fact that
three-fifths were present might be shown from the journals or other
proper evidence. Ibid. In People v. Commissioners, 54 N. Y.
276, it is ruled that laws which come under the constitutional provision requiring two-thirds of the members elected to vote therefor,
are not valid if it does not appear from the statute book or the
enrolled act that they received the required number of votes. In
such cases, where the bill is only certified in the form of an ordinary
majority bill, it is at least prima facie evidence that it did not
receive a two-thirds vote. -Peoplev. Purdy, 2 Hill 84.
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Value of Journals as _Evidenee.-The conflict of opinion between
the two lines of authority concerning the effect to be given to legislative journals is well illustrated by the language of Judge BLACK in
9 Op. Attys.-Gen. 1, and the rule of the New Hampshire court
in -the opinion of the justices, 52 N. H. 622. In Thompson's
Case, Judge BLACK says that, to make all legislation ultimately
depend on the fidelity with which a journal-clerk has made his entries, is to render the law as uncertain as the terms of a horse-trade.
The New Hampshire court say that the journals are to be considered and treated as authentic records of the proceedings of the
legislature, and that theprima facie evidence arising from the enrolled act is overcome by theii showing that the act did not pass.
See 35 N. H. 579. The only provision in the constitution of New
Hampshire concerning journals is that the journal of the proceedings shall be printed and published immediately after adjournment
of the legislature. The rule in New Hampshire is substantially the
same as that in Illinois: Spanglerv. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297: Prescott
v. Trustees, 19 Id. 324; People v. Starnes, 35 Id. 121; Ryan v.
.Lynch, 68 Id. 160; Miller v. Goodwin, 70 Id. 659. To the same
effect is Weild v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111; Fordyce v. Godman, 20
Ohio St. 1; Brady v. West, 50 Miss. 78.
The silence of the journals is conclusive only in those matters
where the constitution requires them to show the action taken:
Chicot County v. -Davies,40 Ark. 206. If the facts which the
constitution requires the journal to set forth do not appear the conclusion is that they did not transpire: Spangler v. Jacoby, ante.
Silence concerning compliance with constitutional requirements
supports the presumption of correct action : In re Roberts, 5 Colo.
525; State v. lead,71 Mo. 266 ; Miller v State, 5 Ohio St. 275;
Worthen v. Badgett, 83 Ark. 496. See Walker v. Griffith, 60
Ala. 861 ; Harrisonv. Gordy, 57 Id. 49.
The recital of the journal are verities. The house keeping it
is the only tribunal by which it can be corrected: N e( uloch v.
State, 11 Ind. 424. Obvious clerical errors in the journal will be
disregarded: Bound v. Railroad Co., 45 Wis. 543 ; Williams v.
State, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 549. Journals may be corrected at any session of the same legislature: Trley v. County of Logan, 17 I1.
151. If there is a discrepancy between the printed and the manuscript journals the latter will prevail : County of Santa Clara v.
Southern Pacific Railway Go., 18 Fed. Rep. 285; Chioot County
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